Introduction
The People's Republic of China and Socialist Republic of Vietnam are probably the best reference points for each other in comparative studies of socialist constitutionalism, not just for their extensive similarities, but also their growing differences. For at least a decade, and especially since 2011, 1 the two East Asian Party-states have been pursuing increasingly distinct paths towards the future.
Although history records that Vietnam has taken important governance cues from
China for centuries, 2 a discernable pattern exists whereby some of Vietnam's more independent moves occur during periods of tension with its neighbor to the north. 3 We seem to be at such a geopolitically-inspired crossroads right now, as China generally and, specifically, to the aspirations of citizens and reformers in socialist states who seek to develop ties to mainstream constitutional discourse.
This chapter provides an overview to comparative study of Sino-Vietnamese comparative constitutionalism by exploring the bases of three core, substantive pillars of socialist constitutionalism through the Sino-Vietnamese comparison: insistence on Party leadership, reliance on socialist rule of law, and adaptation to populism. After considering several examples of how constitutional rules are currently operating through political and popular constitutionalism in all three areas, we conclude that
Vietnam is presently moving in a direction offering more prospects for convergence with international norms, 21 as the current Vietnamese Party-state is relatively less 17 Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes, at 92, also citing Carl Minzner, Xinfang: Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 Stan. J. Int'l L. 103, 143-45 (2006) . 18 Of course, both China and Vietnam make the controversial assertion that their national constitutions are the supreme law of the land (1982 Chinese Constitution, Art. 5; 2013 Vietnamese Constitution, Arts. 4, 8, 9), but the lack of rigorous judicial enforcement does not necessarily mean the constitution is an empty letter. 19 Judicial enforcement is obviously preferable as it is more transparent, structured and formal; political and popular constitutionalism are both characterized by opacity and informal trade-offs, while popular constitutionalism can be informal or occasionally chaotic. institutionalize democratic centralism, and prohibit threatening discourse.
Though Party leadership cannot be changed through any legal means, the organization of that power takes significantly different expressions in China and
Vietnam. While decisive and effective implementation characterizes both orders, the 22 Perhaps this is because that 1946 Constitution represented a synthesis of Western and Ho Chi Minh Thought, calling for a tripartite separate of powers and guaranteeing fundamental rights. David G Marr, Ho Chi Minh's Independence Declaration, in Essays into Vietnamese Pasts (K W Taylor and John K. Whitmore eds.) (Connell University Press, 1995), pp. 221-231. 23 Supra note 4. 24 Article 4 of the Vietnam Constitution (2013) makes the party the vanguard and representative not only of the Vietnamese working class, but of the whole Vietnamese people and nation, further narrowing the legal space to exercise the right to pluralistic and freely contested elections. Article 65 follows the government lead in enshrining a new legal requirement for Vietnam's armed forces to be absolutely loyal to the Communist Party.
Vietnamese Party-state is presently more open to constructive debate within the party forum, as evinced by having more diffuse executive authorities and a more competitive selection process for membership in its Central Committee.
Indeed, both nations feature a Party-state that operates on the basis of democratic centralism. This ensures a decisive decision-making process, thus establishing "effective" states in which policy-making and implementation is swift, owing in part to a denial of separation of powers and a lack of mechanisms through which formal checks-and-balances can be exercised. 25 While these structural deficiencies perpetuate other systemic problems, they need not undercut raw "government effectiveness" which -as defined by international institutions -simply measures whether a regime can implement meaningful change. 26 Fukuyama forcefully argues that state effectiveness is a necessary condition for successful constitutional and legal reform, as strong leaders in the Confucian tradition are well positioned for nation-building, demonstrated by the cases of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore. 27 Once there is the political will to promote reform, effective states have strong institutions to rely upon and competent bureaucrats to implement programs with a high degree of efficiency. 28 Accepting that both states have high implementation capacity, 29 the questions becomes those of political values and will. 25 As the 2014 Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Promoting the Rule of Law (Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding) explains, China will not admit any separation of powers and will not tolerate any institution to have a veto on the Party's decisions. English translation and Chinese original available at https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concernin g-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-for ward/ (last visited 17 . 26 The World Bank provides this definition: "Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies."
27 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy (Profile Books, 2014).
28 "Regardless of the degree of government intervention, the fast-growing economies of East Asia share a common feature: they all possess competent, high-capacity state." Id. at 335. 29 For instance, the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) index measures between the political designs of the two Party-states is emerging. Since the events of 1989, the CCP has since demonstrated a much higher level of concentration of political power in the hands of a smaller number of men, while the VCP has demonstrated signs of political diffusion, splitting into contesting blocs. As a result, the nascent checks-and-balances within the Vietnamese system are more apparent.
Former Chinese President Hu Jintao found the trend so disturbing that he felt compelled to issue an internal Party document:
. . . criticiz[ing] the Vietnamese authorities for moving "too quickly toward inner-party democracy," even warning that a destabilizing Mikhail Gorbachev-like figure could come to power. The CCP also banned public discussion of Vietnam's reforms, deploying party intellectuals to argue publicly against such a political development in China.
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That fear likely emanates from the fact that developments in Vietnam indicate the emergence of more political constitutionalism, as there is more intra-party democracy in the VCP than the CCP.
At the level of elite politics, the commanding heights of Vietnam's Party-state feature a broader policy-making coalition involving more diverse stakeholders in the decision-making process. 31 This is true in both the executive and legislative arenas.
governance ability via six indicators: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. China and Vietnam performed the best in government effectiveness among the six indicators in the 2014 survey. Importantly, China outperformed its "East Asian and Pacific" neighbors in "government effectiveness" while lagging behind in the other five indicators, while Vietnam closely tracked the regional averages. As a lower-middle income country, Vietnam clearly outperformed other similarly situated countries in terms of both "political stability" and "government effectiveness." These assets generate confidence and legitimacy in the durability of the system and hope for its capacity to improve. Vietnam's broader political participation and more fierce political competition make the VCP more accountable, both horizontally and vertically, than the CCP. In contrast, CCP elites are more monopolistic and retain more extensive and institutionalized control over state apparatuses, even overriding state organs in making and implementing decisions. The CCP is deeply embedded in government departments and exercises routine political control of state institutions and public authorities. 45 It relies on informal institutions under the control of the Party known as "small leading groups" which cut across any perceived boundary between Party and
State. 46 These CCP cells play a key role in decision-making within Chinese state organs and are increasingly asserting political control in private sector law firms, accounting firms, and NGOs.
47
There also appears to be a stronger political will for and deeper commitment to structural reform in Vietnam. After a fierce debate, the Vietnamese chose to ratify a new constitution in 2013, rather than amend the old. During the debates, the National
Assembly took a strong position in supporting a proposed Constitutional Council.
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Prior to the abrupt final decision not to adopt it, elements of Vietnamese society undertook a rich discussion of constitutional review that advanced the concept of building such an independent constitutional adjudication forum quite far. 49 To date, 44 Interestingly, when the Guangdong police banned the use of motorcycles in the city, the police only faced a legal challenge by the motorcycle manufacturers. 52 The Party issued a document which lists 7 topics which are off limit in public discussion, commonly referred to 7 prohibitions. It is telling that the Party classified the said document as state secret and sentenced Ms Gao Yu, a 70 year veteran journalist, to 7 years' imprisonment for leaking the document. 54 Though unlikely to be implemented in the near future, such a move would be a remarkable leap in socialist constitutional development. In terms of
Vietnamese constitutional text, it would help promote the People's mastery (Art. 2) and assist the VCP in developing "close ties with the People," "submitting to People's supervision," and assure that the VCP is "accountable to the People in its decisions"
In any event, it is probable that the Central Committee will continue to law. Since shedding their totalitarian approaches decades ago, both Parties have been more reluctant to exercise naked political power. They instead resort to legal institutions to manage and coordinate massive socioeconomic transitions and maintain credibility. Legal reform in authoritarian states is a contradictory process, however, because it can generate tremendous societal demand for individual rights and government accountability. Thus, while the Party-states employ law to achieve certain objectives, they attempt to limit legal reform so as to prevent any political spillover.
Vietnam's experiment has been proceeding in a more internationalist fashion, however, as it has been more welcoming of foreign normative influences, especially in the field of human rights.
What comprises socialist rule of law is the subject of much debate. Chinese and First, owing to their statist stances in imposing legal norms and creating institutions, both states prioritize the "supply side" of the rule of law and rights protection while managing a gradual shift to the demand side. 67 The supply side includes establishing both constitutional and legal rules, and institutions (i.e., courts)
to apply them. 68 The demand side includes rights-awareness on the part of the citizens, as well as tolerance of lawyers and social organizations in channeling disputes into legal institutions that facilitate rights protection. 69 It is to be expected at the beginning of a rule of law building process that rule-making, as a top-down process, has priority. After all, rules must be in existence before they can be enforced.
Once promulgated, the issue becomes whether those rules actually are enforced or remain mere "window-dressing." 70 Therefore, the second stage of reform regards 65 Gillespie and Chen; and Sidel. 66 That model begins with a state-led economic reform, followed by the development of commercial rule of law to facilitate a market economy. In the initial stage, the state promotes civil law rights (i.e., freedom of contract) and socioeconomic rights (i.e., consumer and labor rights), while limiting collective rights and political rights. As the economy grows, the state invests more in institutions, improves education and professional training (including for legal professionals), and diverts resources to human development. From that stage onward -the argument goes -the state is on the defensive and starts to guard its power and privilege, refusing to make further concessions unless absolutely necessary, although there is persistent demand for rule of law, accountability, and an expansion of rights. Third, in both countries, the present state of reform promotes a thin/formal version of the rule of law without dealing with the hard questions posed by a thick/substantive rule of law. The thin version focuses on the internal qualities of law, such as the requirements that law must be public and accessible, generally applicable, and largely consistent. 84 It also focuses on the institutional dimension of enforcement and requires valid rules for law-making, fair application, effective enforcement and general acceptance of rules. 85 Critics who challenge the existence of a "thin" rule of law point out that it does not provide a normative foundation, and is not supported by the sort of rights-based system commonly observed in a liberal democracy. 86 labor sector, (2) a more vibrant religious community, and (3) a more independent lawyers' bar association. On the contrary, the Chinese Party-state, in comparison, has been more decisive and harsh in cracking down on civil organizations and silencing dissenting voices.
(i) Labor
Labor unions in both countries are dominated by their respective communist parties and serve a "transmission belt" of intelligence. 98 Faithful to their ideological roots, both constitutions devote special attention to protect the rights of the toiling people. For example, Chinese workers enjoy constitutional rights to work and rest.
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In that sense, the Chinese Constitution is nominal, but its constitutional provisions are not fully implemented due to the lack of resources and issues of implementation. 100 Vietnam Constitution (2013), Art. 10, reads: "The Trade Union is the socio-political organisation of the working class and labourers, established on a voluntary basis that represents the workers, looks after and protects the legitimate and legal rights and interests of the workers; participates in state administration and socio-economic management; participates in the control, inspection, and supervision of the activity of State bodies, organisations, units and enterprises with respects to the matters concerning the rights and duties of the workers; propagandises, mobilises learning, development of abilities and professional skills, conformity of law, and construction and defence of the Fatherland among the workers."
101 Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung approved Decree 49/2013/ND-CP, which commissioned the establishment of a National Wage Council to oversee national wage levels These developments may come in handy, as both countries experience interest-based industrial action and mass strikes that are likely to increase in size and frequency. 102 The Vietnamese labor law has long authorized strikes under certain circumstances, although those conditions are hard to fulfill, 103 while unions and professional organizations, in spite of their dependence on the VCP, can be relatively more spontaneous and representative than their Chinese counterparts in representing workers' interests against both the state and employers. 104 For example, a significant difference between the two countries is that an enterprise union chair is paid for by unions at the next higher level in Vietnam, while their Chinese counterpart is paid for by the very enterprise the union chair serves. 105 This openness reflects the historical fact that Vietnamese unions are more politically powerful in dealing with employers and structurally more autonomous of the VCP than their Chinese counterpart, the ACFTU.
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The relative strength of Vietnamese workers is also reflected in the fact that, despite the large number of illegal wildcat strikes in Vietnam, few organizers have procedure for the government to petition courts for a declaration that a strike is illegal, the government has never utilized it. Instead, the dismissal of a striker often leads to renewed strikes forcing management to reinstate the dismissed workers. 108 As Simon
Clarke points out, official tolerance of such strikes provides the most powerful incentive for Vietnamese workers to achieve what they want through extra-legal means. 109 In Khanh's view, an over-responsive state thus "has given rise to a negative precedent, making workers believe compliance with the official mechanism for collective labour dispute resolution is unnecessary."
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ii) Religion
The relative open space for religion also reflects a more resilient and rigorous The VCP started to loosen its grip over religious organizations and practices in 1990, and one key development was to accept and tolerate Party members from religious communities. 114 The removal of religious ban on Party members was a recognition and reflection of the importance of religion in the Vietnamese society and contributed to the creation of a more vibrant religious community that cuts across the Party-state and society boundaries. 115 The participation of VCP members in religious activities legitimizes religion in general, opens a space for interaction between the state and the religious sector and, makes the police harassment less likely for the faithful. This difference in whether Party members may practice religion may help to explain why Vietnamese believers practice largely "on the ground" while their
Chinese counterparts do so "underground." The persistent question thus remains whether a Party-state will rely on the formal legal system to resolve disputes according to proper procedures, or resort to repression or other unprincipled informal mechanisms based on political expedience? As numerous studies have shown, unprincipled dispute resolution that bypasses the legal system eventually exacerbates social conflict and becomes a destabilizing factor unto itself. 126 There is indeed an emerging consensus among political elites that dispute resolution based on the rule of law and predictable legal principles is the most cost-effective way to resolve the vast majority of the cases. 127 When discourse signals a constitutional commitment on the part of the Party-state, citizens in both nations have responded by seizing that discourse.
Constitutional rhetoric gives space for articulation and action by civil society, and has inspired people to fight for them even in authoritarian states. The gap between a high normative standard of constitutional rights and low levels of practical enforcement sharpens the contrast between entitlement and reality, creating further incentives and opportunities for mobilization. It is commonly agreed that rights-awareness has been on the rise steadily with political and legal consequences in both countries, 128 and aware citizens invariably demand to exercise those rights through available institutions.
If those institutions fail to deliver, people will create or resort to non-institutional fora for remedies. Ultimately, the authoritarian Party-state's flirtation with rule of law is a double-edged sword which has been wielded with great caution, mindful of law's inherent threat to authoritarian rule.
V. Conclusion
Constitutional rights are alive in people's esteem in both China and Vietnam as grass-root constitutional demands unfold on a daily basis. While judicial construction is severely constrained, citizens actively interpret and implement constitutional rights in forums across both countries including streets, factories, churches and classrooms.
This Chapter conceptualized similarities and differences between three substantive foundations of constitutional practices in both states, i.e., the leadership of the communist party, faith in developing a socialist rule of law, and requisite state responsiveness to popular will.
Regime survival is the ultimate goal for any single party which desires to perpetuate its command of power. The Party-state model is adapting to new circumstances and continues to evolve incrementally to develop and defend its credibility and legitimacy. One core strategy is reliance upon legal rules to discipline the state and impose order in society. Ultimately, rule of law is a double-edged sword which the Party-state must wield with great caution, mindful of law's inherent, potential threat to authoritarian rule. While the Party-state purposively maintains a weak legal system to satisfy its own political agenda, a weak system cannot contain the socioeconomic problems it is designed to resolve. Resort to extra-judicial fora undermines the state's legal system while delegating some degree of constitutional enforcement to the people.
Both constitutional orders are presently locked in a cycle of mobilization and counter-mobilization in which societal forces demand change which the Party-state considers, manages, and occasionally, concedes. This requires the Party to constantly balance its position against popular action pushing for a redistribution of interests or incremental change, while the legal system attempts to impose a degree of regularity.
Where civil society is consulted, that process is likely to go more smoothly and with less resistance then in soil where even nascent organized civil society is resisted. The 
